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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 87-0081-CA 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
RUSSELL BOURNE RASBAND, 
Plaint iff-Respondent, 
vs. 
CAROL T. RASBAND, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
* * * * * * * * 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is vested in this court pursuant to the 
provisions of S 78-2a-3(2)(g) , UTAH CODE ANN. (1953). This is an 
appeal of some of the provisions of a decree of divorce effecting 
the rulings of the Honorable Rodney S. Page of the Second 
Judicial District Court for Davis County, State of Utah, made 
after a one day trial. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. The failure of the trial court to award 
permanent alimony to the appellant after a twenty-nine and 
one-half- year marriage which commenced a few months after she 
graduated from high school, has never been employed on a 
full-time basis and has recently been employed in only 
minimum-wage, part-time employment, while respondent can afford 
the requested permanent alimony which is consistent with the 
marital standard of living, constitutes error which should be 
corrected by this court. 
2. The trial court failed to equitably divide the 
real and personal property of the properties, in view of the fact 
that only the respondent had a demonstrated earning capacity and 
the assets with which to produce income while the appellant, 
after twenty-nine and one-half years as a mother-housewife with a 
high school education and only part-time minimum wage employment 
experience who will be required to maintain a home for herself 
and her mentally-impaired daughter, must sell the family home and 
divide the proceeds of sale within three (3) years of the 
divorce. 
3. The failure of the trial court to award adequate 
attorney's fees to the appellant was an error which must be 
corrected by this court. 
STATUTES 
Section 30-3-5 (1), UTAH CODE ANN. (1953), the statute 
which governs most of the issues of this appeal provides, in its 
relevant portions: 
When a decree of divorce is rendered, 
the court may include in it equitable orders 
relating to the children, property, and 
parties. 
UTAH CODE ANN. (1953) provides: 
The Court may order either party to 
pay to the clerk a sum of money . . . to 
enable such [adverse] party to prosecute or 
defend the action. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties were married for twenty-nine and one-half 
years. Respondent married appellant a few months after she 
graduated from high school. During the course of their marriage, 
the respondent worked while the appellant was a mother, housewife 
and work assistant to the respondent. In 1977, the respondent 
commenced working for State Farm Insurance as a manager of 
insurance agents in which capacity he earned a substantial 
income. In January of 1985 the respondent voluntarily changed 
jobs and became an agent for State Farm Insurance. This resulted 
in a decline in income which he knew would occur when he made the 
switch from manager to agent. 
Throughout the marriage, appellant remained at home and 
cared for the family, although she did assist the respondent in 
his work and periodically took part-time jobs for which she was 
paid a minimum wage. 
The parties had four children, all of whom have reached 
the age of emancipation. However, one of the children, Shelley, 
suffers from a disabling mental impairment. This has resulted, 
in the opinion of the psychologists and psychiatrist who examined 
her, in a condition which will prevent Shelley from ever being 
self-sufficient. She will be dependent upon her parents or some 
agency to provide basic support for her. The appellant has 
provided a home and guidance for Shelley throughout her life and 
continues to do so. Since separation of the parties, the 
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respondent has had very little contact with Shelley and knows 
very little about her activities. 
Based on these facts, the trial court divided the 
personal and real property of the parties equally between them 
and awarded the appellant alimony which declines over a 10-year 
period then continues at the rate of a dollar per year. 
Appellant believes that since the respondent utilized 
his work experience to set up his own business and it was the 
respondent who desired to terminate the marriage, leaving her 
with the responsiblity of providing a home for herself and 
Shelley while making use of his business experience and assets to 
establish his own business, the trial court erred in its 
decision. Appellant asserts that, under the facts, an equitable 
division of the parties1 assets required at minimum that she be 
awarded the equity of the parties in their home as well as the 
furniture, fixtures, furnishings, appliances and personal effects 
that were awarded to her. The court declined to do this and 
ordered that the home be sold within three years. 
It is appellant's position that this is an inequitable 
award. 
The court awarded the appellant declining alimony 
despite the fact that she has not had any education since high 
school and has only limited, part-time work experience. This, 
she asserts, is in violation of the clear guidelines established 
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by the Utah Supreme Court in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 
1985) and Olsen v. Olsen 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985). 
Finally, the appellant seeks an award of reasonable 
attorney's fees for her representation both before the trial 
court and this court pursuant to S 30-3-3, UTAH CODE ANN. (1953). 
She believes the court failed to properly evaluate the complexity 
of the case and her need for assistance. She asserts that the 
issues of hidden income on the part of the respondent, the 
permanent disability of the minor child of the parties and proper 
presentation of the issue of alimony required more extensive 
efforts than were recognized by the trial court. These justified 
both a higher attorney's fee award and an order directing 
respondent to pay a more substantial portion of them as he is the 
only party with income. 
FACTS 
The appellant graduated from Olympus High School in 
May, 1957 and on August 20th married the respondent (R. 72, 
Tr. 220). There have been four children born as issue of the 
marriage (R. 86). All of them have attained the age of 18 and 
graduated from high school (R. 86) but Shelley Rasband, who was 
24 years of age at the time of trial, suffers from a disability 
caused by shrinkage of her brain tissue (R. 87). While Shelley 
does many things by herself, both of the parties agreed that she 
could not be left alone (Tr. 160, 229-230). The psychologists 
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and neurologist who evaluated Shelley related that she will never 
be self-sufficient or self-supporting (R. 109, Tr. 185-218). 
Throughout the marriage of the parties, the appellant 
did not hold full-time employment (Tr. 97, 220). Her longest 
period of employment was part-time which she held for a year and 
three months (Tr. 221). The last few jobs that she held paid the 
minimum wage of $3.35 an hour (Tr. 221). As of the time of 
trial, the appellant testified that she was hindered in seeking 
employment by transportation problems and inadequate glasses 
(Tr. 220). She testified she was unable to afford the new 
prescription glasses necessary to pursue employment 
(Tr. 228-229). She is also required to provide care for Shelley 
who is not independent and has had great difficulty in holding 
jobs (Tr. 221-222, 229-230). 
Appellant handled the family books and payment of the 
bills (Tr. 223). She also assisted the respondent in carrying 
out his business responsibilities and duties (Tr. 51, 133, 236). 
During the pendency of the matter, the appellant did 
not seek employment as she had transportation problems, could not 
read for an extended period as her glasses were not the correct 
prescription, and knew that she would need new glasses before 
obtaining employment. In addition, she had to care for her 
family (Tr. 220-222, 228-229). 
The appellant has had some health problems suffering 
from severe migraine headaches, back and neck problems, a thyroid 
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problem, spine problems and has undergone leg surgery resulting 
in an inability to stay on her legs for long (Tr. 232). While 
the appellant has typing skills (Tr. 261, 54), respondent agreed 
appellant had never held a full-time job (Tr. 97). 
From 1977 through 1984, the respondent was employed as 
a manager of insurance agents by State Farm Insurance (Tr. 34). 
In January, 1985, he became an agent himself (Tr. 33). He became 
an agent by assuming a retiring agent's accounts (Tr. 35,43). He 
did this because he wanted to become an independent contractor 
and not be responsible to anyone (Tr. 43), although he knew when 
he made this change that there would be a substantial decrease in 
his income (Tr. 171-172). 
Respondent testified that, in 1983, he had a nervous 
breakdown and physical health problems (Tr. 41-42). He said as a 
result of the job change, his health is now better (Tr. 57). 
Both of the parties agreed that the appellant supported and 
helped the respondent in functioning as a manager but had not 
been of assistance to him since he became an agent (Tr. 51,133). 
Appellant managed the household on $4,000.00 per month 
supplied by respondent while he was a manager (Tr. 224, 225). 
She testified that dinners, trips and merchandise were all 
purchased for the family and the costs were taken as business 
expenses by respondent for tax purposes (Tr. 236). While 
respondent admitted payment of some personal expenses, through 
his business, he declared that most of the expenses which he said 
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reduced his gross business income were professional (Tr. 76-91, 
162-166). He did acknowledge that these payments include food, 
travel, his car and its expenses, and items of which he made 
personal use (Tr. 76-91; 162-166). 
In 1985, the parties had a gross business income of 
$78,178.00 and a net taxable income of $44,576.00 (Ex. 8). The 
parties subtracted from gross business income of $78,128.00 the 
sum of $63,118.00 as business expenses on their schedule C. In 
1984, the parties had a gross income of $64,642.00 and net 
taxable income of $60,642.00 (Ex. 9). They subtracted business 
expenses of $33,562.00 on Schedule C. In 1983, the parties had 
gross taxable income of $58,390.00 and net taxable income of 
$54,365.00 (Ex. 10). They subtracted $28,430.00 as business 
expenses on Schedule C. In 1982, the parties had gross taxable 
income of $49,214.00 and net taxable income of $45,219.00 (Ex. 
11). They subtracted $24,245.00 as business expenses on Schedule 
C, In 1981, the parties had gross taxable income of $64,650.00 
and net taxable income of $45,223.00 (Ex. 12). They reported 
business expenses of $19,427.00 on Schedule C. In 1980, the 
parties had gross taxable income of $67,759.00 and net taxable 
income of $53,255.00 (Ex. 13). They deducted $14,045.00 as 
business expenses. In each of these years there is a substantial 
reduction of taxable income by those expenses which are shown on 
Schedule C of the exhibits as business expenses. The respondent 
was, at the time of trial, grossing approximately $7,000.00 per 
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month from his business (Tr. 175, Ex, C) and the court found he 
was earning $3,809.00 per month as net business income (R. 73, 
88). 
During the course of the marriage, the parties had 
numerous vacation trips (Ex. 4) which included visits to San 
Diego, several trips to Disneyland, Denmark and Sweden, Hawaii, 
Germany and Austria, Disney World, San Francisco, Monterey and 
Carmel, the Bahamas, Mazatlan, Acapulco, Vail and Aspen, 
Colorado, Jackson Hole, Tetons and Yellowstone, Phoenix, France, 
England, Spain, Italy and Germany and Sun Valley (Tr. 134-142, 
152-155). While on these trips the parties always picked up 
special items like crystal and figurines (Tr. 152, 134-152, 
152-155). 
The appellant desires to be awarded the family home 
(Tr. 243,288). It was her intention to use the house as a home 
for herself and Shelley and to rent part of it to a college 
student to assist her in financially maintaining her household 
(Tr. 288). 
The appellant retained her counsel by payment of a 
retainer of $2,500.00 which was obtained by her daughter cashing 
in her IRA and sundry other sources (Tr. 281-282). She also 
testified she has no cash or method by which to pay her counsel 
(Tr. 246). She testified the divorce was a very difficult 
proceeding for her to experience (Tr. 246). 
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From this testimony, the court entered a ruling in 
which it determined that Shelley has numerous problems, 
(R. 72-80), had some degree of impairment and requested a further 
evaluation by Davis County Mental Health as to the extent of that 
impairment (R. 101-102). After that evaluation, a report from 
Dr. Thomas E. Pritt was filed. It transmitted his opinion that 
Shelley would never be capable of self support (R. 109). This 
was in accord with the opinion of Dr. Michael Goldstein and Dr. 
Sam Goldstein (Tr. 185-218). 
The respondent, by changing from an agent manager to an 
insurance agent, has produced a substantial reduction in his 
income and fringe benefits (R. 73). The court determined that 
the plaintiff generates approximately $6,909.00 per month as 
gross income from this business and has business expenses of 
approximately 50 percent of that gross income (R. 73, 88). The 
court further determined that, after paying business expenses, 
the respondent has approximately $3,800.00 per month before taxes 
to meet family expenses (R. 73, 88). 
The court determined that the appellant was unemployed 
but had a high school degree, managed the household accounts 
during the marriage, assisted the respondent in his business and 
"is capable of meaningful employment in the future." (R. 73, 88). 
The court determined that the appellant had need for 
support between $1,250.00 and $1,400.00 per month (Tr. 74, 88) 
despite the testimony of the appellant that she would need 
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$2,000.00 per month to maintain a household for herself and 
Shelley (Tr. 233) and her need for alimony of $1,500.00 per month 
(Tr. 233). The respondent has need of approximately $1,500.00 
per month including funds for payment of the family debts 
(Tr. 74, 88). The court determined that residing in the home of 
the appellant was an older daughter and friend of the family who 
contributed approximately $200.00 per month to the family 
expenses (Tr. 74, 88, 225-226). However, appellant testified 
that she anticipated this would terminate in April, 1987, when 
the daughter and friend were to be married and set up their own 
household (Tr. 271, 284). 
The court determined that the parties had acquired a 
home in Kaysville, Utah, which had a market value of approxi-
mately $125,000.00 and on which they owe approximately $52,000.00 
(R. 74, 89, Tr. 24). The court determined that child support 
should be paid by the respondent at the rate of $250.00 per month 
(R. 76, 102), then valued and divided the personal property of 
the parties approximately equally (R. 76-77, 102-103). The 
respondent was ordered to assume and pay the debts incurred by 
the family (R. 77, 103-104). The appellant was awarded the home 
of the parties subject to payment of the mortgage (R. 77, 104), 
but was directed to appraise the home within 30 days with each 
party to pay one-half that cost (R. 77, 104). The respondent was 
ordered to be paid $9,992.00 as reimbursement for payment of 
family debts, plus $5,400.00 to equalize the value of the 
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personal property of the parties, then, the remaining equity was 
to be divided equally (R. 77, 104), The respondent was awarded a 
lien against the home to secure payment of these obligations 
(R. 77-78, 104). The lien was to be paid upon the sale of the 
home, the appellant's cohabitation, or appellant's ceasing to use 
the home as her primary residence, within two years of her 
remarriage or 3 years from the date of decree, whichever occurred 
first (R. 104-105). 
The court awarded the appellant alimony in the sum of 
$800.00 per month for one year after which the alimony decreased 
to $700.00 per month for two years, then decreased to $500.00 per 
month for two years and, thereafter, to $350.00 per month for 
five years, after which time it would drop to $1.00 per year and 
would terminate as provided by law (R. 78, 105). 
The court declared that the case before it was not a 
difficult one from either a legal or fact standpoint and did not 
require extensive discovery, then ruled that a reasonable 
attorney's fee would be $3,500.00 and that since appellant had 
paid $2,500.00 of that fee from funds acquired during the course 
of the marriage, respondent should pay an additional $1,000.00 
for the appellant's attorney fees (R. 78-79, 106). These 
findings were made in the face of the proffer of counsel for the 
appellant that there were two particular problems in this case 
which required extensive discovery and preparation. The first 
was the discovery and presentation of the real income of the 
-12-
respondent and the second was evidence of the need for permanent 
support for Shelley Rasband. Also, he testified that the law 
governing permanent alimony required careful preparation of the 
case (Tr. 289-291). 
The decree of the court was formally entered on 
February 11, 1987f and appellant's notice of appeal was filed on 
March 11, 1987. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The failure of the trial court after a twenty-nine 
and one-half-year marriage to award substantial permanent alimony 
to appellant who had a high-school education, married respondent 
a few months after graduation, never worked at a full-time job 
and who had not held a job in the recent past which paid her more 
than a minimum wage, where the respondent could clearly afford to 
pay the requested alimony which was consistent with the marital 
standard of living, was an abuse of discretion and violation of 
the standard governing awards of alimony established by the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
2. The trial court equally, but not equitably, 
divided the property of the parties in light of the length of the 
marriage of the parties, the absence of work experience by 
appellant, the necessity of appellant's maintaining a home for 
herself and the child of the parties who is unable to become 
self-supporting, the work experience of the respondent throughout 
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the marriage of the parties, during which he is obtaining 
experience, contacts and his own business. These factors make an 
equal distribution of the parties1 property inequitable. To 
correct it and to make it equitable, the home and its furniture, 
fixtures, furnishings and appliances must be awarded to the 
appellant, as a basic minimum property distribution. 
3. The failure of the trial court to award a 
reasonable attorney's fee on behalf of the appellant, ignoring 
the difficulty of the case before it, compounded by the errors in 
his other rulings, violated the provisions of § 30-3-3, UTAH CODE 
ANN. (1953). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED 
PERMANENT ALIMONY. 
This court has recently examined the issue of alimony 
and declared: 
A recent Utah Supreme Court opinion 
concerning alimony, Paffel v. Paffel, 732 
P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986), states that the 
purpose of spousal support is to "enable the 
receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as 
possible the standard of living enjoyed 
during the marriage and to prevent the spouse 
from becoming a public charge. The appellate 
courts should not interfere with such an 
award without a showing of a 'clear and 
prejudicial abuse of discretion.1 The court 
in Paffel further sets forth what must be 
considered by the trial court to avoid a 
challenge to the award as being an abuse of 
discretion. These factors are, (1) the 
financial condition and needs of the spouse 
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claiming support, (2) the ability of that 
spouse to provide sufficient income for him 
or herself, and (3) the ability of the 
responding spouse . . . to provide the 
support. 
Eames v. Eamesf 55 Utah Adv. Npt.r. 4 9, P. 2d (Utah 
i ;:IH " I „ Tested dq.jinst I liest- ia«.Lurs the abuse of descretion in 
regard to the failure of the trial court to award financially 
appropriate permanent alimony in tne *s* iv -.«.,, v--—-
c lecii'. 
The appellant has no presen* Income as --<= 
unemployed. She ' -. • ^ ^ 
last 3 0 years. She marriec u few months ou~ ->r m e n school, has 
had no further education arxl held o m y part-time minimum wage 
p o s 11 i o i i s £ o r s 1 I o i: t p e r I. o d s o f t i m e. She t e s 11 f i e d that she has 
difficulties in transportation and with he- glasses. She has 
health problems which establ ish 1 imi tat ions oi i t h e t y p e c: f * : • c 1 i: 
she o u i d a c c e p t . I.s 'lie t a c e of t h i s t e s t i m o n y the t r i a l cour t 
determined that the appellant -> capable c: meaningful 
employment in the future" (n. / J> ?*- • for 
this deter ruination and upon i* :• , • :.- -:/L:- V_: declaring 
alimony. It clearly violates the governing standards articulated 
1 • *° Vr ih Supreme Court i i i English v. English, bbb P
 t"d H."^  
(Utai * evaluated and applied in Gramme v. Gramme, 587 
P.2d .4- .:- . •'- • Higley v. Higley, 6" b p,::d P 3 iUtar 1983); 
Jones v ._ w^L:^. ' wisen v. Olsenr 704 P,,'d 
^ 4 'Utah 1985;; Stephens v. Stephens, 728 P.2d 991 (Utah 1986); 
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and Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986). It is a 
determination based on nothing and is contrary to not only the 
facts of the case but also the experience of our society as 
recognized by and discussed by the Supreme Court in Hiqley v. 
Hiqleyf supraf where the court analyzed and applied the data 
describing a woman's plight in seeking employment. Recent Utah 
studies demonstrate the situation in Utah is even worse. 
"Governor's Task Force on Integrating Women Into the Workforce," 
Utah Women in Economic Crisis, June, 1984, § 2, p. 2, and Parks, 
Lecia, "Hard at Work," Women in the Utah Labor Force, Aug. 1985, 
§ IV, p. 6 and Chap. 4, p. 59. 
Examining the factor of the need of appellant and her 
ability to provide income for herself the record reveals 
appellant testified that to maintain a household for herself and 
Shelley, she requires $2,000.00 per month as income. If the 
appellant secures a job such as she has held in the recent past, 
a minimum wage job, she could earn a gross, pre-tax income of 
$3.35 per hour, that is approximately $134.00 per week and 
$589.60 per month. With or without such a job she is in need of 
the $1,500.00 per month alimony she requested. If appellant 
cannot obtain or hold a full-time minimum-wage job, her earnings 
will be less. 
On the other hand, the respondent had demonstrated a 
long working history which included earning a gross income of 
between $80,000.00 and $100,000.00 per year ~as a manager of 
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insurance agents and at least $7,000.00 ;< month a. insurance 
agent. Accepting the determination c: • • • - * .• t 
earns a net income of at least $3,fl0 i- month * , 
he W.3S capable of i.: viding the alimony requested by t he 
appellant .Dll - - ntl 1. "Fl i i i -„ i" iindei* .1 1 ned hy Hie t HI f 
that the Schedule C Business Expense Deductions, while perfectly 
lega. , include payment - . * substantial personal expenses, such ,-• 
• • = 11 a 1 1 sp : . i ni 1: 1 e 1 11 a 1 id t r av e 1 f c • 1 :i e s p o nc - • 
which increases r, • actual, available income to above $3,800.00 
per month. The failure of the trial court to appropriately 
consider these income factors violates the guidelines of 
analyzing business income articulated in Jones v. Jones, 700 P. 2d 
1072, 1075-76 (Utah 1985). 
Thus, the record demonstrates both the need of the 
appellant for $1,500.00 per month as permanent alimony and the 
:* . im. T* 
demonstrates the requested sum is consistent with m e liresty.e 
of the parties. This failure violates the direction of m e 
S1 1 preme Con 11 1: i 1 1 Hiqley v. Hiqley, supra. 
The Utah Supreme Court has, in the recent past, tw* 
considered the issue of permanent alimony in cases similar to the 
instai it 111 HI 1 I-M ami 1 e versed decisions failing to awar^ 
financially appropriate permanent alimony Jones v. Jones, 
supra, the Court rule:; that it wa, > :i* •• ^ 
alimony in fhp fa^ <=> •» long-term •« a,»- ^tre : r • + + :*•. ,a : 
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work or education producing an expectancy of self-support. This 
was not altered by her participation in the family business or 
volunteer work. Mrs. Jones, like appellant, did not have further 
education or work experience which endowed her with an ability to 
earn income at a self supporting rate. 
Of a similar nature is the decision of the Utah Supreme 
Court in Olsen v. 01senr supra, where the Court ruled that 
awarding alimony which terminated after two years was 
inappropriate where the wife had married immediately out of high 
school and had not worked while raising a large family. 
In both Jones , supra,and Olsen, supra, there was no 
demonstrated ability of the wife to earn any substantial income 
while such an ability had been demonstrated by their husbands. 
That is equally true of the instant matter. 
Subsequent decisions of the Utah Supreme Court in 
Stephens v. Stephens, 728 P.2d 991 (Utah 1986) , and Paffel v. 
Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986), applied this rationale in 
sustaining court awards of permanent alimony utilizing the 
criteria recapitulated by this court in Eames v. Eames, supra. 
The instant case falls clearly within the articulated 
guidelines for permanent alimony established by the Utah Supreme 
Court and applied by this court in Eames v. Eames, supra, and 
Bovle v. Boyle 55 Utah Adv. Rptr. 51, P.2d (Utah 1987). 
The appellant enjoyed a standard of living that involved 
substantial entertaining and travel. She ran a household on a 
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$4,000 , 00 per* month allowance . She has no demonstrated abi 11ty 
t • :: 2 a i: i i a b e • e a i i t i n i n 11 in i v a • g e S h e m i I s 1: p r o ;'" I d e a 1 I o n i e f o r a n 
intellectually-impaired child who will never be able to support 
herself. The e r - r * ••- ~rial court in this matter must be 
!' p v i •' J " s e 11 a n i. i * - - e qi i e s t e c:i a m c i 11 I t, $ 1 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 
per month, should be awarded. 
POINT 11 
TO EQUITABLY DIVIDE THE PROPERTY OF THE 
PARTIES, THE MARITAL HOME SHOULD BE AWARDED 
TO THE APPELLANT. 
The trial court divided the property > parties 
equal 1 y bet*; een them * -• ••-r-/ thic - - •• *--••• : -. " 
not equitable. That inequity
 ;r.u=>t be corrected by *:. rus court. 
The parties acquired their :r.e vii *"^ e furniture, 
fixtures, furnishings and appliances : . • " -. ° •.*• . : their 
marriage. Included tlie intangible personal property 
accumulated during the twenty-nine and one-half years of tlle 
i nar r iage i s the bus iness acumen, bus iness contacts and bus iness 
knowledge acquired by the respondent while the appellant managed 
the f ami I lousehold. Those now are tat -,pecif ic assets • : f 
responden .:-.u.;-, use of them,, to woru fr\r~ .. -.ate Farm Insurance 
Company anc when ::- determined that r- wished to leave that 
employmr-iv - :
 ( h r , n v n i n s u r e .• * • "e ::I:i ci so. 
Making use of that knowledge and experience, :^  operating his 
own business. While he has just started the business and it has 
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a present liquidation value of approximately $10,000.00, his 
knowledge and experience are an intangible value which is 
considerably more valuable than this sum. It will lend to the 
growth of the business as he operates it. This was neither 
valued nor considered by the trial court. 
While respondent was acquiring this asset the appellant 
was providing care for the family and helping the respondent 
conduct his businesses by maintaining the books and supporting 
him in his activities. Now that the respondent has chosen to 
terminate the marriage, the appellant is left with no significant 
income, earning experience, education or income-producing assets 
and is required to provide a home for herself and the permanently 
dependent child, Shelley. To do this, she will require not just 
the child support of $250.00 per month ordered by the court but 
the existing, marital home. In failing to provide this, the 
trial court failed to equitably divide the property of the 
parties. 
In making this challenge, the appellant acknowledges 
the burden that she must meet in securing assistance on this 
issue from this court. This was recently articulated by the 
Supreme Court in Alexander v. Alexander, 56 Utah Adv. Rptr. 31, 
P.2nd , (Utah 1987): 
As long as a property division is made 
within the standards set by this Court we 
will not disturb the trial judge's decision. 
Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d at 1074; Burnham v. 
Burnham, 716 P.2d 781, 782 (Utah 1986). . . 
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This Court endows the court's adjustment 
of the financial interests of the parties 
with the presumption of validity and does not 
review their values absent a clear abuse of 
discretion . , . We do not lightly disturb 
the property divisions made by the trial 
court and uphold its decision except where to 
do so would work a manifest injustice or 
inequity. Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d at 119 
(citations omitted); See: Savage v. Savage, 
658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1 983). 
56 Utah Adv. Rptr. -K ' ;\ _ P.>d ir 
• ^- t si such .i man it est in 
justice as equire this court M intervene. 
Appellant acknowledges that an equal division . J 
er t y i s :>i i i t s £ a :: e ai i equitable d i v i s : "f ^ ? n nlv : , t.-xam 
ination of the facts and circumstances • : :r. s :as^ tr.cv resul 
from the dissolution of this •;<—:ao - . - -_ 
trial court's decision can be discerned. 
The t r I a1 < nourtf s respons ibi1i t y in dividing th 
p r o p e r t y h a s b e e n a i t i c i i ] a t e d b y t h e U t a h S u p r e in e C o u i -1 , 
It is the court's duty to make a division of 
the property and income in a divorce 
proceeding so that the parties may readjust 
their lives to the new situation as well as 
possible. MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah 
573, 236 P.2d 1066 (1951). There is no fixed 
rule or formula for the distribution of a 
marital estate. In MacDonald v. MacDonald, 
supra, the Court listed 15 factors which may 
be considered in adjusting the rights and 
obligations of the parties. They include: 
the respective ages of the parties; what each 
may have given up for the marriage; what 
money or property each put into the marriage? 
the physical and mental health of the 
parties; the relative ability, training and 
education of the parties; the duration of the 
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marriage; the present income of the parties; 
the efforts exerted by the parties in 
acquiring marital property; the present 
mental and physical age of the parties; the 
life expectancy of the parties; the ability 
of the wife to provide income for herself; 
the ability of the husband to provide 
support. 
Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6, 8 (Utah 1982). 
In the instant case, the trial court did not carry out 
the primary mandate of this direction. It did not make a 
division of the property and income so that the parties could 
readjust their lives to the new situation as well as possible. 
Appellant must provide a household for herself and a 
mentally-impaired child of the parties. She has no education or 
job training that will lead to the expectancy of her earning 
significant income or accumulating significant assets with which 
to do this. Respondent testified that he, at the time of trial, 
was unaware of Shelley's current problems (Tr. 151-152). He has 
established his own apartment, his own business, takes his own 
trips and has assumed his own life. Appellant, on the other 
hand, not only cares for the mentally impaired child, but is very 
much involved with and providing assistance to as well as 
receiving assistance from her other children, family and friends. 
It was her request that she be awarded the house and its 
furniture and fixtures, furnishes and appliances to provide a 
home for herself and the mentally-impaired child. She plans to 
make use of this resource by renting part of the space to college 
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students which would enable her to provide additional income and 
assistance- * -'aiiiii'i Hn hi ujj.Hhn 1 <1 , This home r. t I' *•* M M ] } 
asset w^t; income-producing potential which could be awarded 
•_ jppe I . ar.r . 
A- i1. i . li.'-n WIIM] H Mil1 i-ifties had ',< legal or 
ongoing obligations to their children,, ai 1 equal division of 
propert ---.. ; >-.-.<- --tii appropriate, However, in the circum-
stai - • that i <=; ^ r * r u *» '• ^  ^ppellB n f m n c f 
continue - : provide <T- heme f, : herself and her chile. Sr;~ c- - ;. 
not iiave tne jvnuwieuyti, wont e x p e r t : • <* --v 
of the respondent, yet the trial cou - .ns -.:.vide; equally ::e 
property and ordered declining alimony. * - three years the 
proper t y i s t : be equ a ] 1 y d i v i d ed by 1:1 I e s a ] i hon i e o f 11: I e 
parties. Doing this will require destruction ::f : r.e h e r ••? * -* 
the appellant has maintained for herself and ner daughter win±e 
p r o v i i'i i n g arid i t '} *"* respondent. 
It war • • c respondent who determined that he r.o longer 
wished *-o Liv-1 * ~ *.e appellant and moved en it, T K j trial cc.'rt 
is allowing simply equally divide the property and walk 
away from the situation that he has created, that ; -. a * *- •< 
: rspared • support herse'* * ^  r * :; . 
impa ~. « . ..ever i^ » m © f> support herself 5:.d t : * 
'--. ;n;r,er : .s- proved- -=•* Testing * r <= :-3 * ^:~uation 
agair • >- >•**< Turner v. Turner, supra
 r 
MacDonald v, MacDonald, 236 P,2d 1066 (Utah 1951) and Pinion v. 
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Pinion, 67 P.2d 265 (Utah 1937), the error of the court becomes 
obvious. These factors have been discussed above and, in the 
crucial areas of ability to provide for support obligations to 
the dependent child and ability to pay, the trial court did not 
correctly assess the evidence. 
This error becomes even more apparent when decisions of 
the Utah Supreme Court affirming awards that were not equal are 
examined. In the case of Pope v. Popef 589 P.2d 572 (Utah 1978), 
the Utah Supreme Court held that an award of 65 percent of the 
property to the wife and 35 percent to the husband was 
appropriate where there were two children, the husband had 
attended college and obtained both a bachelor's degree in 
engineering and a master's degree in business administration 
while the plaintiff had terminated her education and spent her 
time caring for the children. In Henderson v. Henderson, 576 
P.2d 1289 (Utah 1978), it was held appropriate to award 
two-thirds of the property to the wife and one-third to the 
husband when the husband was awarded custody of the five 
children. In Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980), the court 
held equitable a division of property which, according to the 
defendant's figures, awarded two-thirds of the family property to 
the wife and one-third to the husband or, according to the wife, 
55 percent to her and 45 percent to the defendant. In Yelderman 
v. Yelderman, 669 P.2nd 406 (Utah 1983), a division of 56 percent 
of the property to the wife and 44 percent of the property to the 
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husband was upheld even though the wife was also awarded alimony. 
In Workman v. Workman, 652 P.2d 931 (Utah 1 9 8 2 ) , Savage v. 
Savage - ;: •-. , <• . Berger v. Berger y 1713 
P. 2d 6?o W , * M : 1985) division :•! v>C percent r he marital 
proper 4/ 'c * --.ie aiivi * percent tu t:*- -- o •••••-\ - -
eqi lit .able. Turner v. Turner, 649 P*^ ..; -i^c... • .- :• 
Supreme Court affirmed a property distribution *h;rr, ^ . 
under her calculatio. i ^ " « •- - -. ' ; = 
under h^*- husband 1 C circulations received ^ percent : 
assets. Each he rases presented different fact situation, 
bi it, • - i . . :,
 :>r opi "late that an 
equal -JIV-.S. -.*: issets vas nit ecj-.t-ip/ie, 'hat the equities 
required an unequal distribution of the properties. Ii\ any of 
these cases
 r an equal -J IV is ion would have been inequitable. That 
is true of the instant case and requires the intervention of this 
court. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE AWARDED 
REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES ON BEHALF OF THE 
APPELLANT. 
The trial coi irt n i] ed t h a 4 * "l •; ,: • -, • 
should have been prepared and tried iur $3,50C. 1.. h> 
court determined that since the appellan* *:a : -3ised ^2,500.00 ui 
this on h<rj i i A 11 In )in t i m'iK ti< q i i i ^ marriao^, nniu 
$1,000.00 - - ::-<-- ' ' - H respondent. That was an erroneous 
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ruling under the guidelines established by the Utah Supreme Court 
for application of § 30-3-3, UTAH CODE ANN. (1953) and this court 
should reverse or modify that ruling and award appropriate 
attorney fees both for the trial and this appeal. 
The Utah Supreme Court ruled in Kerr v. Kerrf 610 P.2d 
1380 (Utah 1980), that a court in a divorce proceeding is 
empowered to award attorney's fees pursuant to § 30-3-3, UTAH 
CODE ANN. (1953). The decision to make the award and the amount 
awarded rests primarily with the sound discretion of the trial 
court based on evidence of need and reasonableness, 610 P.2d at 
1384. The Supreme Court declared that issues which should be 
considered in making the award are whether or not the plaintiff 
would be unable to cover the costs of the litigation, 610 P.2d at 
1384, and whether the plaintiff or defendant would be better able 
to pay the fees in light of the property award, 610 P.2d at 1384. 
The court noted that there must be testimony in regard to the 
reasonableness of fee, the rates charged, the difficulty of the 
case, the result accomplished and the rates commonly charged for 
divorce actions in the community should be considered, 610 P. 2d 
at 1384-85. The court went on to observe: 
The lawyer's service may include the 
sharing and identifying with his client in 
problems in the deepest emotional content, 
such as losing or the saving of family 
relationships, or even at time of life 
itself, wherein the extremes of sorrow or of 
happiness may depend upon his failure or 
success. Some observation can be made in a 
lessor degree in regard to business matters 
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in which his role is to provide the founda-
tion, guidance and protection of vital rights 
and property interest. All of these may be 
materially affected by the quality of service 
of the 1 awyer chosen to serve in such matter, 
The choice of a lawyer and the value -: 
his services may depend upon a number o: 
factors including his background of learning 
and experience, his ability, his integrity 
and dedication to the causes with which he 
identifies himself. Also to be considered is 
the reputation he has acquired, the nature 
and the importance of the matter, and the 
amount of money or value of property 
involved. There is also the matter of how 
the lawyer is to be paid: cash in advance, 
extended credit, whether a fixed amount or 
contingent on success, or other conditions, 
What the lawyer has to offer should be 
determined by considering the composite of 
all of these factors which the party them-
selves think relevant. Within the limits of 
reason and good conscience, and where there 
is no over-reaching, undue influence or 
oppression, the parties should be at liberty 
to contract as they desire. 
610 P.2d at 1 385. The Supreme Court reaffirmed this rationale in 
Delatore v. Delatore, or' (Utah 1984) and Cabrera v. 
Cottrell, 694 P.2d 62? (Utah ^t- . 
In the instant matter, counsel for the appellant 
testified that he a^^ > specian - • - * * ^ : f^ 
f am i i y 1 a w ("I r. ^ + ^  ^  ^  *- h -. q u u . *. * - :\ ^  ;. : - -
recognized by hi s election as a Fellow in the American Academy f 
Ma t r i mo n y I a w y e r s (T i 289) a nd 11 I a t 1: I I e i: e we i: e p a r t i c 
problems faced in this case, hidden income, permanent dependence 
of a child and the need for permanent alimony (Tr. 289-291). He 
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testified that while his billing rate was above the going rate in 
the community, he thought the charges were reasonable because of 
the particular problems presented by the case (Tr. 289-291). He 
testified he had utilized the services of a legal assistant to 
reduce the charges incurred and believed that those, too, were 
reasonable (Tr. 289-91) and appropriately should be awarded. 
Continental Townhouses East v. Brockbanky 733 P.2d 1120 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1987). 
In rejecting this testimony and ruling that the case 
was a simple one, the trial court did not analyze the testimony 
presented or issues involved. This is highlighted by the action 
of the trial court itself in requesting a third opinion regarding 
Shelley's condition and his errors in failing to correctly apply 
governing law. 
The evidence was clear that the appellant has no cash 
with which to pay her attorney and that she had borrowed most of 
the required retainer from her daughter who raised the funds by 
cashing in the daughter's IRA. This did not pay the full bill. 
The trial court did not set out his analysis, simply 
his ruling, thus, this court must review that ruling in light of 
the totality of the evidence and, in this regard, if it 
determines that appellant's position is correct, that the alimony 
award is an error, the property award is in error and the trial 
court had difficulty in determining the issue of the disability 
of Shelley, then, it would also be true that the trial court 
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erred in failing - understand the case, which explav v~.y 
appeared so simple. That error now inquires this r o y ' 
the trial court to assess an appropriate attorney fee, ir;:luding 
attorney's fees required ;• coming to this court to readdress the 
actions he 1: ia• :I t a k e i 1
 f i ,/..- ] 1 ai 11 h e Jl i e * e s tIII: 1 e f e e s :i i 1 cur red i n 
bringing this matter before this court should also be assessed 
pursuant to § 30-3-3, UTAH CODE ANN. (1953). 
CONCLUSION 
Appellai it seeks a permanent alimony award of $1,500.00 
per month to which she believes that: she is entitled, after a 
twenty-nine and one-half-year m a r r i a g e i i p o n w h i c 1 I s h e e i 11 e r e c:i 
immediately after graduation from high schoo.: -: - :.i not hold 
full-time employment during the course of the marriage; the 
respondent did, Mf ln.ii It up subs tdin i d 1 business expertise and 
now operates his own business. Respondent can afford the 
requested alimony and the amount requested is consistent wi t .h tl: le 
] i festy] e of t .1 le p : * r the criteria established by the 
courts of the State of L,tah, applying + r.e provisions of § 30-3-5, 
UTAH CODE ANN. (1953 = , tue trial court p-red ir ' , . -
1
 !,•-• , rqaesi e..i
 h«ei :i> - - nt alimony to the r:^*n: ;: f . 
The trial court failed to equitably divide the property 
, - *
 (. parties. This is one of those I iniqi le cases where equal is 
- ;..*a:i;'. The failure of the trial court to recognize this 
and n:s failure to award the plaintiff all of the eqi lity of the 
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parties in their home must be corrected by this court in view of 
the totalty of the circumstances, that is, the need of the 
appellant to maintain a home for herself and the permanently 
dependent child of the parties, the need of the appellant for the 
income potential of the home, the necessary award to the 
respondent of his business and business experience, and the 
ability of the respondent to make use of legitimate business 
expenses to enhance his actual income. 
Finally, this court should require payment by the 
respondent of an appropriate attorney's fee reversing the trial 
court's erroneous determination that a minimal fee is all that 
respondent should pay. In addition, the court should require the 
respondent to pay the costs and attorney's fees incurred by the 
appellant in bringing this appeal before the court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of May, 1987. 
DAVID 
of ana tor 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorney for Appellant 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: 532-1234 
S. DOLOWITZ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
o 
> 2 U J r . 
U CC C/> ^ 
£ -J ^ O 
<2i8 
RUSSELL BOURNE RASBAND, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
CAROL T. RASBAND, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CIVIL NO: 39262 
This matter having come on regularly for trial on the 
5th day of December, 1986, before the Honorable Rodney S. 
Page, one of the Judges in the above-entitled Court, sitting 
without a jury, and the Plaintiff appearing in person and 
with his attorney, Pete N. Vlahos, and the Defendant appear-
ing in person and with her attorney, David S. Dolowitz; and 
it having been shown that the Defendant was duly served with 
a copy of the Complaint and a copy of the Summons, and 
wherein the Defendant filed her Answer and Counterclaim, 
that each of the parties having been sworn and testifying in 
their own behalf, Exhibits having been offered and received, 
FILMED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
witnesses having been called by both Plaintiff and Defen-
dant, and the Court having taken said matter under advise-
ment and having rendered its Memorandum Decision in writing, 
and the Court being fully cognizant of all matters pertain-
ing therein, enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That Plaintiff and Defendant have both been actual 
and bona fide residents of Davis County, State of Utah, for 
at least three (3) months prior to the commencement of this 
action. 
2. That Plaintiff and Defendant were married in Salt 
Lake City, Utah, on August 20, 1957, and ever since said 
time have been and still are husband and wife; that there 
have been four (4) children born as issue of this marriage, 
three (3) of the children are emancipated and one (1) minor 
child, to-wit: Russell Brian Rasband, born April 5, 1969, 
and that both parents are fit and proper persons to have the 
care, custody and control of the minor son. 
3. That the Court finds that' the Defendant has 
treated Plaintiff cruelly and that Plaintiff has treated 
Defendant cruelly in that each is unable to get along with 
the other party, rendering further marital relations between 
the parties intolerable. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 2 
4. That the parties daughter, Shelly Rasband, is 24 
years of age, but suffers from a condition caused by shrink-
age of the brain tissue which occurred prior to her birth or 
shortly thereafter. 
5. That Shelly has graduated from high school and has 
acquired 180 plus hours of college credit over 5 years that 
she has attended Weber State College. 
6. That Shelly has some problems with fine motor 
skills and with tasks that require reasoning. 
7. That Shelly1 s IQ is in the low normal or border-
line range. 
8. That the classes that Shelly has taken in college 
have not helped her to become more independent or trained 
her for any vocation where she could make an adequate 
living. 
9. That the Court has some question as to the degree 
of her impairment and whether she can become 
self-supporting. 
10. That the Plaintiff is self-employed as an agent 
for State Farm and has been since 1985. Prior to 1985 the 
Plaintiff was an agent/manager from 1977 until 1985. 
11. That the Court finds that from Plaintiff's trans-
fer from an agent/manager to an agent that it has meant a 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 3 
substantial reduction in income and fringe benefits for the 
Plaintiff. 
12. That the Plaintiff generates approximately 
$6,909.00 per month gross income per month from the business 
and that Plaintiff's expenses in regard to the running of 
the agency run approximately 50% of his gross income, so 
that after paying the business expenses, the Court finds 
that Plaintiff has approximately $3,800.00 per month before 
taxes to meet family expenses. 
13. That the Court finds that the Defendant is unem-
ployed but has a high school degree, that she has managed 
the bills of the marriage and has assisted the Plaintiff in 
his business and is fully capable of meaningful employment 
in the future. 
14. That the Court finds that Defendant's needs are 
between $1,250.00 and $1,400.00 per month. 
15. The Court finds that Plaintiff has needs of 
approximately $1,500.00 per month including the payment of 
the family debts. 
16. That the Defendant has an older daughter and 
friend of the family residing with her presently who con-
tribute approximately $200.00 per month towards the family 
expenses. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 4 
17. The Court finds that the parties have a home 
located in Kaysville, Utah, with a fair market value of 
approximately $125,000.00 and there is approximately 
$52,000.00 mortgage on the family home. 
18. That the Court finds that Plaintiff has approxi-
mately $10,000.00 which he would receive from State Farm 
should he leave the agency that he has with State Farm which 
is the residual he has built up in connection with his 
agency. 
19. The Court finds that Plaintiff has also acquired a 
retirement from State Farm which is totally vested. 
20. That the Court finds that the parties have in-
curred the following debts and obligations, to-wit: State 
Farm Credit Union of approximately $24,000.00, $4,000.00 of 
which is for the Pontiac automobile, and the balance for the 
Plaintiff's Lincoln automobile, for monies he borrowed for 
the business and the car that he purchased for his son. 
That in addition the Plaintiff has a loan to Commercial 
Security Bank Mastercard of approximately $2,400.00, Commer-
cial Security Bank VISA of approximately $1,390.00, Commer-
cial Security Bank Gold Mastercard of $3,000.00, Commercial 
Security Bank Guarantee Card/Wife's overcharges of $860.00, 
Dr. Belnap of $450.00, Dr. John Stinner - Defendant's dental 
expenses - of $433.00, State Farm Life Insurance of 
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$9,866.00, Bon Marche of $200.00, Castletons of $292.00, 
ZCMI's of $400.00, Family Bank of $6,000.00, and that the 
Court finds that from the above debts, all are family 
expenses except the $20,000.00 borrowed on Plaintiff's 
Lincoln automobile for sums used in the business, the Gold 
Masterchard, the State Farm Life insurance loan, and the 
debt due and owing Family Bank, said family debts total 
$9,992.00. 
21. That the Court finds that the parties each have an 
IRA account of $7,500.00. 
22. That the Defendant has a life insurance policy 
with a $2,000.00 cash value, and that Plaintiff has a life 
insurance policy with a cash value, but he has borrowed the 
value of that cash value and utilized the funds in the 
business. 
23. That the parties have acquired two (2) sets of 
wedding rings for the Defendant during the course of the 
marriage, each valued at $3,500.00; one (1) set is a gift to 
the Defendant and therefore not included as a value, the 
other was purchased by the parties from the insurance 
carrier after it was lost and has a value of $3,500.00. 
24. That the Defendant withdrew approximately 
$8,500.00 from family accounts in the summer of 1985, some 
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was used on family expenses and other sums are unaccounted 
for. 
25. That the Plaintiff received certain sums of money 
as an inheritance from his parents, that those sums were 
comingled with family funds and used by the family either in 
paying expenses or setting up savings accounts. 
26. That the Plaintiff has retained Attorney Pete N. 
Vlahos to represent the Plaintiff and the Defendant has 
retained Attorney David S. Dolowitz to represent the Defen-
dant and each has incurred attorney fees and costs. 
27. That Defendant has already paid to her attorney, 
David S. Dolowitz, the sum of $2,500.00. 
28. That from the above and foregoing Findings of 
Fact, the Court arrives at the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the Plaintiff, Russell Bourne Rasband, is 
entitled to a Decree of Divorce from the Defendant, Carol T. 
Rasband, and the Defendant Carol T. Rasband is entitled to a 
Decree of Divorce from the Plaintiff, Russell Bourne 
Rasband, said divorce to become final upon the signing and 
entry. 
2. That the Defendant is awarded the care, custody 
and control of the minor child, Russell Brian Rasband, born 
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April 5f 1969, subject to the Plaintiff's right to visit at 
all reasonable times and places. 
3. That the Court reserves ruling on the dependency 
of Shelly Rasband, age 24, and orders that the minor child, 
Shelly, be evaluated by the Davis County Mental Health to 
determine her degree of impairment, if any, and whether she 
is capable of self-care and support. Cost of said ex-
amination is to be paid by the Plaintiff. The Court contin-
ues the matter relative to her support for a period of three 
(3) months or until February 24, 1987, on the question of 
continued support. 
4. That during the pendency, the support order shall 
be the Plaintiff is to pay support for two children at the 
rate of $250.00 per month per child. 
5. That the Defendant is awarded the Pontiac automo-
bile with a value of $2,500.00 and Plaintiff is to have the 
transmission repaired, Defendant is awarded the furniture 
and fixtures in her possession with the exception of the 
following: 
The office Desk 
The file trays 
The Spaulding Manuscript book 
The books on Great Discussions 
The guitar amplifier 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
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The slide projector and screen 
The pictures from Plaintiff's mother's estate 
The round mantel clock 
The Silver and Wooden case 
The two Stifle lamps 
That the value of the furniture awarded to the Defen-
dant is determined to be $10,000.00. 
6. That Defendant is further awarded the two sets of 
wedding rings, one being valued for settlement purposes in 
the amount of $3,500.00, her life insurance cash surrender 
value of $2,000.00 and her IRA account of $7,500.00, and 
that the total value of the personal property awarded to the 
Defendant is $25,500.00. 
7. That Plaintiff is awarded the right to the de-
ferred premium of the business valued at $10,000.00, the 
Suzuki motorcycle valued at $800.00, the Lincoln automobile 
valued at $800.00, the furniture and fixtures and items set 
forth valued at $1,800.00, his IRA valued at $7,500.00, his 
life insurance which has no cash value he having borrowed 
the same, and the Court determines the personal property 
awarded to the Plaintiff has a value of $20,100.00. 
8. That Plaintiff is ordered to assume and discharge 
the balance of the family debts which include $4,000.00 of 
the State Farm Credit Union loan, Commercial Security 
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Mastercard - $2,400.00, the Commercial Security Bank VISA -
$1,390.00, Commercial Security Bank Guarantee Card 
$860.00, Dr. Belnap - $450.00, Dr. John Stinner - $433.00, 
Bon Marche - $200.00, Castletons - $292.00, ZCMI•s -
$400.00, having a total sum of $9,992.00, and is to hold the 
Defendant harmless. 
9. That the Plaintiff is awarded the business of the 
parties and to assume those debts incurred in the business 
including $20,000.00 to the State Farm Credit Union, the 
$9,866.00 to the State Farm Life Insurance loan, and to 
Family Bank - $6,000.00, and the Court feels that the value 
of the income potential of the business obligations offsets 
those debts. 
10. That Defendant is awarded the home of the parties 
subject to the exiting mortgage thereof, provided however, 
the home is to be appraised within thirty (30) days, and 
from the equity therein, the Plaintiff shall receive 
$9,992.00 to reimburse him for the payment of the family 
debts plus $5,400.00 to equalize the Value of the personal 
property received by the respective parties, and the balance 
of the equity shall be divided equally between the parties. 
The parties are to share equally the cost of the appraisal. 
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11. That Plaintiff shall be granted a lien against the 
real property to secure the payment of the sums as 
hereinabove set forth. 
12. That Plaintiff is to receive said sums upon the 
sale of the home, the Defendant's co-habitation, the Defen-
dant ceasing to use the home as her primary residence, 
within two (2) years of her remarriage, or three (3) years 
from the date of the Decree, whichever occurs first. 
13. That in the event the home is sold, the Plaintiff 
is to share in the costs of sale in the same percentage that 
the lien amount hereinabove granted bears to the total 
equity in the home at the time of sale. 
_ ->>^i-:7 *-* ^ 
14. That Plaintiff h& maintain health and accident 
insurance on his son, Russell, and also Shelly, so long as 
the company will allow, provided however, that each of the 
parties are to share equally any non-covered medical ex-
penses on any minor child, and the Court reserves the issue 
concerning the medical expenses on Shelly for further 
determination. 
15. That the Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant the 
sum of $800.00 per month alimony for a period of one (1) 
year, thereafter said alimony shall decrease to the sum of 
$700.00 for two (2) years, $500.00 for two (2) years, 
thereinafter $350.00 for an additional five (5) years, after 
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which it shall be reduced to $1.00 per year. Said alimony 
shall terminate as provided by law. 
16. That the Defendant is hereby awarded one-half of 
Plaintiff's interest in any retirement benefits obtained by 
the Plaintiff from State Farm Insurance Company during the 
course of the marriage as provided under the Woodward 
decision and shall be payable to the Defendant in said 
proportion when the Plaintiff commences receiving said 
retirement. 
17. That the Court determines that the case before the 
Court is not a difficult one from a law or fact standpoint 
and one not requiring extensive discovery. The Court fees 
that a reasonable attorney's fee for the Defendant would be 
$3f500.00, she has paid $2,500.00 of said fee from monies 
acquired during the course of the marriage and the Plaintiff 
is ordered to pay an additional $1,000.00 to the Defendant 
for the use and benefit of her attorney. 
DATED this H day of ^ ^oua^y3, 1987. 
BY THE COtJRT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM; 
(PiCriViAJUf \# < s 
rtOHtfRABLE/ RODNEY 
D i s t r i c f c - ' C o u r t J 
sV PAGE 
udge 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Attorney for Defendant 
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RUSSELL BORNE RASBAND, 
Plaintiff, 
vs : RULING 
CAROL T. RASBAND, 
Defendant. 
'1 1 le Coi irt having heard the testimony in the above-entitled 
matter and having reviewed the evidence presented by "tr • parties 
and being fully advvised in the premises, hereby rules as follows: 
1. The parties were married on August 20,1957, that each 
were residents of Davis County at least, three' months prior to the 
fil . • • complaint in this matter. 
2. That four children have been born as issue of the 
marriage and only one of said children has not reached his 
majori y 
3- That the parties daughter, Shelly, is now 24 years of 
age but suffers from a condit.1011 eaus>ed by shrinkage of the brain 
tissue which occurred prior to her birth or shortly thereafter. 
- That; Shelly has graduated from high school and has 
acquired 180+ hours nf college credit over five years. 
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5. That she has some problem with fine motor skills and 
with tasks which require reasoning. 
6. That her I.Q. is in the low-normal or borderline range. 
7. That the classes she has taken at college have not 
helped her to become more independent or trained her for any 
vocation where she could make an adequate living. 
8. That the Court has some question as to the degree of her 
impairment and whether she can be self supporting. 
9. That plaintiff is employed as an agent for State Farm 
and has been since 1985. Prior to that time he was an 
agent/manager from 1977 until 1985. 
10. That going from agent/manager to agent has meant a 
substantial reduction in income and fringe benefits for the 
party. 
11. That plaintiff generates approximately $6909.00 per 
month gross income per month from the business, that plaintiff's 
expenses in regards to the running of the agency run 
approximately 50% of that gross income. 
12. That after paying business expenses, the Court finds 
that defendant has approximately $3800 per month before taxes to 
meet family expenses. 
13. That the Court finds that the defendant is unemployed 
but has a high school degree and has managed the bills of the 
marriage and has assisted plaintiff in his business and is 
capable of meaningful employment in the future. 
') 
14. That the defendant has needs "f between Z\2lA) arit 1 SHOO 
per month. 
15. That the plaintiff has needs of approximately $1500 per 
month, including the payment ni f\inu i / debt, s. 
16. Tl lat defendant has an older daughter and friend of the 
family residing with her presently who contribute approximately 
$200 per month In fr4iriily expenses, 
17. The parties have acquired a home i Kaysville with a 
market value of approximately $125,000 and th€ • owf- approximately 
$52,000 on ihd't home . 
18. That plaintiff has coming from State Farm approximately 
$10,000 which he would receive from State Farm should he- leave 
immediate]y. 
19. That plaintiff has also acquired a retirement from 
State Farm. 
20. That the parties have acquired debts during the course 
of the marriage, certain for family expenses and certain for 
business expenses. 
21. That the plaintiff has a loan to State Farm Credit 
Union for approximately $24,000; $4,000 of that is for the 
Pontiac automobile and thii- balance is fui his Lincoln automobile, 
for monies borrowed for the business and a car he bought for his 
son. 
22. Thai plaintiff aJsn ha"- « Commercial Security Bank gold 
card and a loan from the family bank which were both used for 
business purposes. 
W 
23. The parties have family debts as set forth in 
plaintiff's Exhibit A, page 2, as Items 1 ($4,000 of which is 
family debt), Item 2, Item 3, Item 5, Item 6, Item 7, Item 9, 
Item 10 and Item 11, totalling $9,992.00. 
24. That the parties have each acquired an IRA of $7500.00. 
25. That defendant has a life insurance policy with a 
$2,000 cash value and plaintiff has a life insurance policy with 
a cash value but that he has borrowed the value of that cash 
value. 
26. That the parties have acquired two sets of wedding 
rings for the defendant during the course of the marriage, each 
valued at $3500.00; one is a gift to the defendant and therefore 
not valued, the other was purchased by the parties from insurance 
carrier after it was lost and has a value of $3500.00. 
27. Defendant withdrew approximately $8500.00 from family 
accounts in the summer of 1985. Some was used on family 
expenses, other sums are unaccounted for. 
28. That plaintiff received certain sums as an inheritance 
from his parent, that those sums were co-mingled with family 
funds and used by the family in either paying expenses or setting 
up savings accounts. 
From the foregoing, the Court concludes as follows: 
1. Each of the parties is awarded a Decree of Divorce from 
the other to become final upon entry. 
0 
2, That the defendant is awarded the care and custody of 
the minor child of" tlie paiiies subject to reasonable rights of 
visitation I n the plaintiff. 
3, That the Court reserves ruling un tn* ^ - .•*•*• 
Shelly and orders thai ntm- bt- rvdluated by r»=a, ..- County Mental 
Health to determine her degree of impairment, t -v-v <-f ^  -whether 
she Is capable of self-care and support 
examinat ion Is to be po) d by the plaintiff. The Court continues 
the matter relative to her support for a period of three months 
until February 24, 1987 on the question of continued support. 
4, Tfi.it pending determination of the support order 
defendant is to pay support for the two children at the r ate of 
$250 per month per child. 
5, That the defendant is awarded the Pontiac automobile 
with a value of $2500 and plaintiff : •; * * H , - the transmission 
repaired, the fuTnitu?*' and IIXOIJI* . ^, possession with the 
excepti on of the office desk, the file trays, the Spaulding 
manuscript book, the books on "Great Discussions", the guitar 
amplifier, t N" sli(J*j piujector and screen, the pictures from 
plaintiff's mother's estate, the round mantle clock,,, the silver 
and wooden case and two Stiffle lamps The- value o«f the 
furniture awarded to pi ainti ff was given $10,000. 
fi Defendant is further awarded the two sets of wedding 
rings, one being valued ioi beitie^'it purposes at, the amount of 
$350 ; *> :• nsurance wi th a cash value of $2000.00 and 
her IR£ <- : $7500. . 
7. The total value of the personal property items awarded 
to the defendant is $25,500.00. 
8. The plaintiff is awarded the right to the deferred 
premiums in the business valued at $10,000.00; the Suzuki 
motorcycle valued at $800.00; the Lincoln auto valued at $800.00; 
the furniture and fixtures and items set forth above valued at 
$1800.00; his IRA valued at $7500.00; his life insurance which 
has no cash value he having borrowed the same. 
9. The value of the personal property awarded to the 
plaintiff is $20,100.00. 
10. That the plaintiff is ordered to assume the balance of 
the family debts in the sum of $9,992.00 and hold defendant 
harmless thereon. 
11. Plaintiff is awarded the business of the parties and to 
assume the debts thereon the Court feeling that the value of the 
income potential of the business offsets these debts. 
12. Defendant is awarded the home of the parties subject to 
the mortgage thereon. The home is to be appraised within thirty 
days and from the equity therein the plaintiff should receive 
$9,992.00 to reimburse him for payment of family debts; in 
addition he should receive from the equity the sum of $5,400.00 
to equalize the value of the personal property received by the 
parties; and the balance of the equity should be divided between 
the parties. The parties are to share equally the cost of the 
appraisal. 
'7 
I hat, plaintiff should be granted a lien against the. 
real property to secure the payment of the sums as set forth 
above. 
14. Those sums are to pad d to the plaintiff upon the sale 
of the home, upon defendant's cohabitation, upon defendant 
ceasing to use the fionit»
 r*s h<jt ||n nil. ry residence, within two 
years of her remarriage, oi three years from the date of the 
decree, whichever occurs first. 
15. :i i iR snirf t*** plaintiff is 4"-
share in t . -: • : t-a.f- in the same percentage - ha- *-\~ . 
amount hereinabove granted bears iu i:ne * - * - me 
at i/he ti - . 
16. Plaintiff is to maintain health and accident insurance 
on his son and Shelly so long a>> t hi- company will cillow, The 
parties are to share equally any non-covered medical expense on 
any minor child and the Court reserves the issue relative to 
Shelly for further determi nati on. 
17. The Court further orders that the plaintiff is to pay 
to the defendant alimony in the amount oi S6u0 per month for a 
period of one yeai , a 1terwhjch said limony shall decrease to the 
sum of $700 per month for two years ~. ; N5C * fir two years and 
thereafter $350 i •- an additional five years ai whi» h time i t 
sha: ;- ,: alimony is to terminate as 
provided by law. 
18. That the defendant is hereby awarded a 1/2 interest in 
any retirement benefit obtained by the plaintiff from State Farm 
during the course of the marriage as provided under the Woodward 
decision. 
19. Court finds that the case before the Court is not a 
difficult one from a law or fact standpoint and one not requiring 
extensive discovery. The Court feels that a reasonable 
attorney's fee for defendant would be $3500 and that she paid 
$2500 of said fee from monies acquired during the course of the 
marriage and finding that she is presently unemployed orders that 
the plaintiff pay an additional $1,000.00 to the defendant for 
the use and benefit of her attorney. 
Plaintiff's counsel is to prepare Findings and Decree in 
accordance with the court's ruling and submit a copy to 
defendant's counsel before submitting to the Court. 
DATED this ft*^ day of December, A.D. 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
District Court Judge fl 
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